Journalism and its Public Functions
Emerging Forms of Public Communication
In considering the theme of our colloquium, "Multimedia: A Revolutionary Challenge," I was led to ask: for whom, or against whom, is the revolution being waged? Although we have become inured to the term "revolution," it still connotes a clash of forces and a struggle for power. And I think that this "multimedia revolution" is no exception.
Today the
field of journalism is undergoing a rapid transition from a print-based
to an electronic culture. This may seem an odd proposition. After
all, we have lived with radio for seventy-five years, and television
for fifty. It is well known in the United States that most Americans
receive their news from television. Hasn't this transition to
an electronic culture of journalism already taken place? It would
seem that the stakes here are not print-culture against an emerging
electronic culture, but a struggle for dominance between the first
generation of radio- and televisionbased electronic media, on
the one hand, and the emerging generation of electronic communications
technologies that we have been discussing for the past day.
I
submit that in the field of journalism this transition to an electronic
culture has not yet taken place. What distinguishes journalism
from all other forms of multimedia is its publicness, its Öffentlichkeit
which persists even in the United States which has lived within
a media system dominated by commercial values for at least 150
years. In a few moments, I will develop this notion of the public
sphere functions of journalism, but for now I wish simply to make
one presupposition clear: the public sphere functions of journalism
inhere in print culture, which is fundamentally a culture of discourse,
deliberation, and interpretation. This journalistic culture in
the United States has been preserved primarily through the institutions
of our daily newspapers.
The
market structure of the newspaper has been rooted in a complex
market bundle. News is sold to audiences and audiences are then
sold to advertisers. This market bundle, in turn, made the separation
of the newsgathering and editorial from the business functions
of the newspaper possible. That organization has remained relatively
autonomous from market structure. This autonomy has sustained
the deliberative values of print in the editorial culture, and
its ethics of independence, balance, and objectivity.
These
same ethics were carried forward into the news organizations of
the first generation of electronic media. There is a founding
myth of electronic journalism in the United States, and it revolves
around the figure of Edward R. Murrow and the CBS news organization
that he built to cover World War II. For many years CBS news was
considered the touchstone of "quality" journalism in
the electronic media; more recently that mantle has passed to
our National Public Radio. It is no accident that CBS was, and
NPR is, the most "print-like," the most discursive,
of our electronic media. To the extent that electronic journalism
had standards and models, then, at least until the mid-eighties
they were rooted in print culture.
In
the last decade, these standards have begun to erode, as a result
of two revolutions in journalism: a revolution in industrial structure
and a revolution in culture. It is not possible to understand
the contradiction that inheres in the concept of "multimedia
journalism" without considering each of these revolutions
separately. We have to begin with the challenge to the newspaper
industry, which remains the core institution of print culture
in the field of journalism.
Newspaper
publishers in the United States now worry out loud about whether
and how they will survive an onslaught of information providers,
from telephone and cable companies to the so-called information
utilities. These concerns have heightened the traditional tension
between the editorial and business sides of news organizations,
with the heads of business staffs condemning their editorial colleagues
as ostriches, and editors and reporters decrying the philistines
who would destroy the very integrity of journalism.
There is
growing evidence that the fears of traditional news providers
are not misplaced. There is an rapid divergence between the traditional
news industries, particularly the newspaper but also broadcast
news and the world of "multimedia" - a term which covers
a multitude of new products and delivery systems from the growing
electronic information networks to the delivery of entertainment
to the home. We can understand this split in several ways. The
first is the movement from a mass market for news to a fragmented
market segmented according to demographic strata. The second is
the movement from the vestigial public values that were supported
by the mass market orientation of the traditional press to a set
of values that is defined largely by the pursuit of higher income
consumers.
Let me
offer a few examples of the rapid decomposition of the traditional
news markets. Only fifteen years ago, CNN was born. The advent
of 24-hour world television news began the speedup of the global
information cycle, and stimulated the demand for multimedia news
in real time. We are just now beginning to see the full effects
of this change. From here it is only a short step away to the
digital video news service now being discussed by Oracle, with
AT&T, MCI and Intel with CNN and Reuters providing the news.
This network will let personal computer subscribers create customized
video newscasts or do online video research. The Oracle service
will compete with the video news services now being offered by
Bloomberg Business News and Dow Jones, with the important difference
that the new service will be able to be randomly searched and
accessed.
These services,
at least for now, are being offered primarily to business and
institutional customers, those who can afford the substantial
costs of delivery for real-time digital video. But a multitude
of similar "news" services will soon be available to
homes, schools, and other sites of consumer demand. They now arrive
mostly via phone lines. Soon they will be available via cable,
satellite, and broadcast. Major information utilities like Prodigy
and America Online have been offering news and information services
for several years, and are rapidly expanding onto the World Wide
Web, the interconnection of graphically driven, hypertext linked
"pages" that support multimedia through the Internet.
The Ingenius
service for schools, a joint venture of Reuters and Telecommunications
Inc. is delivering a full motion multimedia newspaper to schools
via cable in selected cities, and it seems certain that this venture
is a testing bed that will soon be expanded. Bertelsmann has made
an agreement with America Online to provide multimedia services
to Europe, and is now engaged in discussions with Deutsche Telekom
and France Telecom. Just in the last month Rupert Murdoch and
MCI agreed to a major joint venture to provide Fox "content,"
industry jargon for programs, over MCI's global networks. And
last, but not least, Microsoft is now hiring journalism graduates
as rapidly as it can to begin its own online "news"
service that will be made available over its own network, which
will be able to be accessed by every user of its new Windows 95
operating system.
I could
go on, of course, but I simply want to convey the breadth of these
new information offerings that are directly linked to the traditional
and relatively well-bounded business of news provision in order
to give you some idea of the ways in which journalism is beginning
to "unbundle," to borrow the phrase of my colleague
William Blankenburg. The tightly constructed bundle of services
offered by the traditional news organization consisted of the
provision of information to readers or viewers, the sale of a
news product to that readership (in the case of newspapers) and
the sale of those readers and viewers to advertisers. It is precisely
that bundle that is beginning to fall apart under the assault
of a number of forces.
The new
information services that I have just described threaten to erode
the monopoly on the provision of news and information to readers.
This in turn threatens both the sale of the traditional news product
to those readers and the sale of the readers to advertisers. As
this process continues and advertising revenues decline, the ability
of traditional news organizations to maintain the same levels
of news gatherers and organizers-reporters and editors-is eroded
in turn, devaluing the news and information that they provide
and opening the way for new competitors. Thus begins a vicious
cycle of expanded competition that has begun to seriously erode
the economic foundation of the news organization that we have
known in the West since the mid-19th century.
At this
point we should ask: what difference does it make if the traditional
news organization declines? Isn't this simply part of the cycle
of capitalist competition and technological innovation? Surely
an institutional structure that developed in the 19th century
is long overdue for a fundamental change. Further, if people choose
to receive their news over a computer, isn't this a major improvement
that will allow readers to receive much more of the news that
they want, and much less that they do not? Don't the new sources
of information serve as perfectly adequate substitutes for traditional
journalism?
It seems
certain that the decline in readership of traditional newspapers
that has already begun will continue. In May 1995 a circulation
audit of America's ten largest newspapers showed that nine had
suffered circulation declines from the previous year. The largest
decline, suffered by NewYorkNewsday , was 7 percent. The only
substantial increase was for Ruppert Murdoch's NewYorkPost, up
7 percent (suggesting at least some shift of readers from Newsday's
more serious tabloid to the Post's more sensationalistic subway
paper). One reason for the general circulation decline cited by
newspaper executives was the effort to increase prices for newspapers
in order to shift the cost of the paper from advertisers to readers.
Even though the consequence is a drop in circulation, publishers
are willing to live with this decline because the readers retained
are the "quality" readers desired by advertisers, in
otherwords, readers in the highest demographic categories.
This is
the beginning of the answer to our question concerning economic
change. Publishers who accept this circulation decline are indicating
a retreat from the traditional economic structure of the newspaper
as a mass market provider of information. There is also strong
evidence of a willingness to shift toward new forms of information
provision by American newspapers. As of December 1994, sixty U.S.
newspapers were publishing online editions either over local dialup
services, or over the commercial information utilities such as
Prodigy and Compuserve, including some of the largest and most
important in American journalism: theNewYorkTimes, WallStreetJournal,
LosAngelesTimes, WashingtonPost, and Knight Ridder newspapers.
An additional twenty-seven, with some overlap, published some
form of edition on the world-wide Internet. The New Century Network
has just been formed by eight major newspaper groups to set up
a cooperative wire-type service to share electronic articles and
databases over the Internet. Almost daily, new electronic editions
go online, indicating that this trend, while in its infancy, is
serious and will continue to grow.
This shift
has clear implications not only for the economic viability of
the daily newspaper, but for its changing public role. The acceptance
of general circulation declines in exchange for a smaller audience
of middle- and upper-middle class readers indicates not only a
retreat from the mass market, but from the newspaper's role of
public sphere institution as well. Before returning to our larger
argument, let me offer a few examples of the kind of audiences
that news organizations are now pursuing.
A 1994
profile of home Internet users shows that their average yearly
household income is almost $67,000, compared to $42,400 for the
U.S. as a whole, or half again as large. Eighty-one percent of
Internet users have graduated from college, compared to thirty-three
percent of all Americans. Sixty percent are white collar, compared
to thirty-four percent of the American people as a whole. Forty-one
percent work for their corporations at home. We could go on, but
the picture is clear. This is an upper stratum of the population
to whom not only the online services, but, as we have seen, the
traditional newspaper as well, will increasingly cater.
So we have
a broad picture of the impact of multimedia information sources
on the traditional economic structure of news and of the movement
of the traditional newspaper toward wealthier audiences. Our task
is now is to sort through the implications of this shift for journalism.
Until now we have looked at the impact of the economic structure
of the new media on traditional news organizations. But we have
not considered the changes that these shifts will bring in journalism
and its public sphere mission. As journalism is the second major
term of our question - whether multimedia journalism is a contradiction
in terms - we need to examine what journalism has been and should
be, before we can proceed.
I strongly believe that the question "what is journalism" can only be answered in a comparative perspective. That is to say, what journalism is and has been in Germany differs considerably from what it has been in the United States. To avoid facile generalizations I will remain close to the case of the United States. If this seems too parochial, I can only say that as has so often been the case, for better or worse, new media trends in the United States tend to work their way outward, so perhaps the dictum de te fabula narratur applies.
Michael
Schudson, in Discovering the News, describes the rise of American
journalism on the twin pillars of commercialism and objectivity.
Beginning around 1830, the U.S. penny press, brought about a commercial
revolution in American newspapers. In contrast to the period of
partisan, political journalism that characterized the U.S. till
that point, the commercial press sought a mass audience. To find
that audience, it engaged the broadest-and some would say the
lowest-common denominator of the rising cities by developing a
series of genres in reporting that we now call "tabloid":
crime, entertainment, and so on. The concept of objectivity that
developed concurrently with the commercial press filtered out
"opinion" in such a way as to narrow the definition
of news to that which could be reported from the "beats,"
the regular set of police, court, and other venues that provided
the news that counted for the mass, urban, commercial newspaper
audience.
In contrast
to this particular conception of commercial and objective journalism,
we might counterpose another tradition, that of Öffentlichkeit,
or the public sphere, which in contemporary discourse has largely
been defined by Jürgen Habermas in his masterwork, The Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere. I do not want to extensively
review his argument, but a few words are necessary. For Habermas,
journalism is, of course, part of the public sphere in which rational-critical
public discourse is formed and represented. His account is both
historical - in arguing that such a sphere existed in the late 18th
and early 19th centuries but then declined - and normative. I am
concerned here with the normative dimension of Öffentlichkeit,
that is, as a standard of rational-critical public discussion
that we can hold up to journalism in order to ask both how it
does function and how it should function.
Now U.S.
journalism has long held that it has fulfilled its public sphere
responsibilities, and that is why it receives its special protection
against government interference by our First Amendment. In the
story that it tells of itself, U.S. journalism is commercial to
be sure, but it is simultaneously objective, and this very objectivity
allows it to fulfill both its First Amendment and public sphere
duties: to provide a free and open marketplace of ideas open to
all. The reader of Schudson's work, and a number of other empirical
studies that have followed in its wake might question this story.
As we have seen, when U.S. news institutions claim public functions,
they are actually describing their outreach to amass audience,
and it is this activity - mass market appeal - rather than public
discussion per se that undergirds their fundamental self-justification.
Because the pursuit of a broad mass market has grounded the parallel
fulfillment of public functions, the fragmentation of that market
into more narrow demographic strata allows news institutions to
retreat from the broader public when it becomes profitable to
do so, as indeed they are now doing.
This, of
course, is the dilemma of a commercial news system. In the United
States, that news system receives constitutional protection because
it represents the public sphere. But its own perceived economic
self interest may lead it elsewhere. And this is precisely the
dilemma that we now face with the emergence of multimedia journalism.
As we have seen, the centrifugal tendencies that lead to the unbundling
of traditional journalism have not necessarily originated with
the new multimedia. But multimedia greatly accelerate these tendencies.
The convergence of the unbundling of traditional news, multimedia
competition, and the fragmentation of the mass market may bring
traditional news organizations to a crisis point before they understand
these effects and learn to manage them.
One of
the most important of these effects is the further erosion of
the public sphere constituted by American journalism. Despite
the constant tension between commercialism and the public sphere,
American journalism has, in fact, been constitutive of many of
the positive elements of public life that do exist in the U.S.
Newspapers, especially, but also local television stations, have
been central in constituting community identity, which in turn,
leads to the possibility of public life.
This "imagined
community," to use Benedict Anderson's term, is the framework
in which individuals and groups who would otherwise never come
in contact with each other imagine themselves as part of a city,
state, or nation, and the mass media are the irreducible precondition
of these larger identities.
The term
"imagined" might lead one to believe that imagined community
is purely subjective or normative concept. Rather, it describes
the very real, connective functions that mass media perform in
order to make civil society and public life possible. Without
these boundary-spanning media institutions no contemporary public
sphere would be possible.
This ability
of journalism to reach across boundaries, to tie disparate groups
in society together, and to form the connective tissue that makes
imagined community possible underpins the possibility of public
life. And it is in this sense that we ask whether multimedia journalism
is a contradiction. In a multimedia world marked by the progressive
fragmentation of both the presentation of news and of the communities
that receive it, is it meaningful to continue talk about journalism
as a public sphere institution?
Part of the answer to this question lies in the explanation of how media industries and audiences shaped by the structures of mass communication are likely to change under the pressures of new media. In The Future of the Mass Audience, Russell Neuman describes the emergence of a realm of "mini-communication" derived from Tetsuro Tomita's concept of "media gap." Neuman calls this discovery "a gap in the structure of the personal and mass media at the critical intermediate level of the small interest group or the community organization." New media are best able to address this quasi-group, participative activity most closely linked with associative democracy and civil society. In otherwords, in the gap between micro-communications - the one-to-one medium of the telephone - and mass communication - the one-to-many media of broadcast and newspapers - there is an area in which the public sphere functions of the traditional mass media and the communicative qualities of new media potentially begin to converge.
The question
before us is not whether convergence will take place but whether
journalism is possible in this converged environment and what
it might look like. For journalism to endure it will, paradoxically,
have to return to an older set of core values, those of Öffentlichkeit,
without, however, the secure economic structure of the mass market.
These will be difficult and treacherous waters to navigate and
many venerable journalism institutions may find themselves struggling
to survive. Some will turn to better marketing as a strategy.
For example, the Times Mirror Company, publisher of the Los Angeles
Time and New York Newsday, recently hired a new chief executive
from the consumer goods giant Procter and Gamble who immediately
made clear that he will apply a "new consumer orientation"
to new media ventures. When asked to clarify he offered the examples
of the successful marketing of cereals, cake mixes, and "Hamburger
Helper."
It is too
early to know whether this emphasis on packaging will be successful
in the marketplace. But it seems clear that it could be fatal
to the public values of journalism. Beyond this, I believe it
could cripple the news industries themselves. By aggressively
pursuing commodity information strategies aimed at the so-called
upscale markets of current online users, newspapers may find themselves
abandoning the very publics that they need to survive and prosper
in the future. In a cycle of unintended consequences, the pursuit
of niche strategies and minority markets erodes the very public
that can serve as the foundation of a mass market in news.
How might
this public be preserved, reinvigorated, and extended in an era
of multimedia? There are some directions that we can look toward
and they reside precisely in this realm of group-to-group communication.
The most successful online services to date have been discussion
groups in which users talk to one another. These virtual communities
have driven the major commercial online services, like Prodigy.
But we also have examples of small local services like the WELL
in San Francisco, or New York Online, which draw together users
oriented toward each other on the basis of both interest and geography.
These successful online discussions started with local user
groups, but they have extended beyond local boundaries to include
like-minded individuals from across the United States and around
the world. The online discussions express a desire for community
and public connection.
These same
desires are expressed at the institutional level in the public
journalism movement in the United States which has grown rapidly
in the past several years. Public journalism, briefly, is an approach
to news that sees its main goal as helping to develop public solutions
to problems. It holds that rather than simply describe the breakdown
of public life, news organizations should educate citizens and
provide them with avenues to participate in public life and civil
society. For example, in Wisconsin, the governor faced a panel
of citizens who had met for weeks in advance to analyze the state
budget. Seated below the panel, the governor answered pointed
and detailed budget questions posed by truck drivers and teachers
(which were often better than those asked by professional journalists).
Other projects have included in-depth reporting on local community
problems in which public solutions are also proposed and debated;
town hall meetings where citizens directly question politicians
with advance discussion and preparation; and citizen panels which
grapple with complicated issues like government budgets, taxes,
and health care.
Since 1992,
more than 60 ongoing public journalism projects and experiments
have grown up in the U.S., with more added each month. Proponents
and practitioners range from the Boston Globe, owned by the New
York Times, to the Wichita Eagle in the middle of Kansas.
The desire
for communities that work and deliberate together is a powerful
counterweight to those forces that would split communities apart.
This is also the space in which multimedia journalism might emerge,
taking advantage of both the peculiar conversational possibilities
of the new media, and the values of Öffentlichkeit that inhere
in the old. Whether these possibilities will be realized is difficult
to say. But there is some hope that the American traditions of
local democracy and decentralization can also lead to a period
of experimentation in that quintessential local institution, the
newspaper. Online services can complement the traditional newspaper
by adding a new dimension of community dialogue, an ongoing conversation
about public life that was simply not possible before. If communications
technology is used to reinvigorate civil society, rather than
to fragment it, then multimedia journalism might, indeed, be possible.